Radiation Sensor and Electronics
An ion chamber is typically used to measure airborne radiation. Fig. 3 shows the basic design of an ion chamber. High voltage is applied to the HV electrode such that the radioactive gas will be ionized, generating a very small current that is measured by an electrometer. Background currents can be as low as 10 Femto Amps (i.e., 1.0E-14 A). Since false alarms will cause major facility disruptions, the ion chamber electronics must be able to measure these currents without generating false trips, even in the presence of electromagnetic interference (EMI) generated from solenoids, pumps, variable speed drives, etc.
Fig. 1. Typical glove box wiring at a nuclear facility.
Building upon an electrometer design with a patent pending [2] , SRNL developed a radiation sensor ion chamber that allows radioactive gas to pass between the cylindrical screens for detection. The plate spacing has been designed such that the operating voltage is 50 V, eliminating electrical safety concerns over the exposed energized screen. The outer screen, however, is grounded. Fig. 4 shows an example of a screen wire ion chamber.
The ion chamber is a coaxial design consisting of three concentric cylinders. Each cylinder is an electrode fabricated of stainless steel screen. Voltage is applied to the middle electrode. The outer electrode is grounded and acts as an ion trap for ions that have been generated outside of the active volume of the chamber. The volume between the center electrode and middle electrode defines the active volume. All ions generated within that volume are swept to the center electrode generating a small current, typically in the range of 1.0E-14 to 1.0E-3 amps.
Typically, ion chambers are designed to operate at a bias of several hundred volts to ensure complete collection of the ions generated. Because this chamber would be operated in areas accessible to personnel, the chamber was designed to operate at 50 V dc. A saturation curve was generated with the ion chamber immersed in a gas chamber. As shown in Fig. 5 , the chamber reaches 99% of the saturation current at 25 V dc and is stable to within 1% of reading over the range of 40 -60 V dc. Leakage current is problematic with the currents at which these devices operate. Therefore, great care is taken during fabrication to maintain the cleanliness of the electrodes and insulators. Once in the field, the chamber will, collect dust over time, resulting in abnormally high and fluctuating background measurements. To alleviate this issue, a sheet of five micron filter paper is fixed around the chamber and periodically replaced in the field. The five micron filter paper protects the ion chamber from dust and other contaminants and does not measurably change the instrument response time.
Calibration is performed using a National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) traceable gas mixture in a sealed chamber at multiple concentrations. The calibration uncertainty is approximately 7% of reading, 2 sigma, with the primary contributors being the uncertainty of the NIST standard itself and the random uncertainty of the measurement.
Since nuclear facilities utilize high flow HVAC systems that are designed to move air quickly from the clean area into process areas and then to a stripper or similar system, diffusion is sufficient to get a representative air sample into the screen wire chamber. The sensitivity of the ion chamber is determined by the active volume and background current of the electrometer. Active volume can be increased to increase the sensitivity; however, space and weight become a limiting factor. It is expected that wireless air monitoring will actually prove to be more reliable than the wired equivalent, by reducing the number of components in the air monitoring system. Security issues can be mitigated by a combination of cryptography and a Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS).
Utilizing an electrometer design that can measure 1 fA of current generated by the presence of radiation even in the presence of EMI allows for a fast response to any airborne activity above normal background. A custom pre-amplifier has been developed [2] with a multi-layer printed circuit board located in a radio-frequency and magnetic field shielded enclosure. Fig. 6 shows a top view of the enclosure. The pre-amplifier measures the very small ion chamber current in the fA range and amplifies it.
The pre-amplifier features a first stage gain of 1 Trillion converting 1 fA to 1 mV. The first stage amplifier has a 60 fA input bias current. The second stage has a gain of 100, but it is combined with a temperature compensation circuit that corrects for the offset of the first stage amplifier. Mu metal is used to line the interior of the RF enclosure to minimize magnetic fields as well as electrical fields. This is essential to minimizing the background current to a few fA. The single-pole-singlethrow relays have three leads: two for the relay signal and one that connects a Faraday shield around the relay to the ground plane in the printed circuit board. A PC104 single board computer is used to monitor the output of the pre-amp voltage to trigger rangechanging relays such that the pre-amp can measure from fA to microamps. The PC104 software, written in C code, converts the current to engineering units such as microcuries per cc. The PC104 computer has an RS232 serial output for transmitting the activity data, alarms and system status.
Wireless Network
A wireless network for this application provides several advantages over the typical wired monitoring systems. The cost of running cable into a process room can be as high as US $2000 per foot. A wireless system could save millions per deployment. In addition, the sensors can be placed anywhere, removing the need to pump air samples to the sensors. It is expected that wireless air monitoring will actually prove to be more reliable than the wired equivalent, by reducing the number of components in the air monitoring system. Security issues can be mitigated by a combination of cryptography and a Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS). Classified government communications are protected by special "Type 1" encryption products that are controlled by the National Security Agency (NSA). They have strict security controls that make them cumbersome to store, operate, and share with partners. These products also take multiple years to design and develop, and the lengthy process does not allow the NSA encryption products to keep pace with technology innovation. Since these products are only sold to the U.S. government, which limits the market size, the resulting Fig. 6 . A custom pre-amplifier with a multi-layer printed circuit board located in a radio-frequency and magnetic field shielded enclosure.
Addressing the concern with latency, the Fortress wireless network implementing Suite B has been shown to be capable of deterministic response of less than 1 s based on 24 h/7 d a week continuous testing. Spoofing and man-in-the-middle attacks are prevented since the Suite B design requires that each data transmission include an encrypted digital signature.
products are significantly more expensive than commercial alternatives that solve similar problems. With the development of more mature and robust open standards, the NSA is addressing these issues through "Suite B Cryptography" [4] which is a set of approved commercial algorithms and protocols that, when implemented correctly in a layered approach, can be used to protect classified U.S. government information up to the SECRET level. Suite B has been selected by the NSA from cryptography that has been approved by NIST for use by the U. S. Government and is specified in NIST standards and recommendations. Suite B is part of the NSA Cryptographic Interoperability Strategy (CIS), developed to improve information sharing within the U.S. and with coalition partners. Open standards and the use of strong public algorithms provide interoperability and allow for the possibility of release to coalition partners or state and local governments. Suite B may be used to protect sensitive but unclassified (SBU) data, as well as classified information (SECRET) with NSA approval, where currently only Type-1 products are approved. This provides a solution that will free organizations from the onerous burdens and handling requirements currently associated with Controlled Cryptographic Item (CCI) equipment. Since the vast majority of classified information is SECRET or below, approved Suite B products could significantly improve the speed and flexibility of deploying secure, commercial-off-the-shelf-based communications systems. Table 1 details the algorithms associated with Suite B cryptography. In addition to implementing the proper cryptographic protocols and algorithms, these Suite B Information Assurance products must be validated and certified in accordance with National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Policy (NSTISSP) No. 11, Revised Fact Sheet National Information Assurance Acquisition Policy [5] . Depending on the information being processed, this validation and certification must include NIST Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) certification under the Cryptographic Module Validation Program per FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules and evaluation per the NSA/NIST National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) evaluation and validation program. In addition, Suite B products intended for use on classified systems must undergo additional evaluation by the NSA.
To meet the commercial standards-based layered solution requirements for using Suite B, a wireless sensor network based on the IEEE 802.11 WLAN standards was chosen. The maturity of the 802.11 security protocols was a key factor that influenced this selection. Fortress Technologies was awarded the contract to develop this 802.11 wireless sensor network solution for the Department of Energy based on their leadership as an early adopter of the NSA's Suite B vision. Using existing components in the Fortress product line enabled the rapid development of a Phase 1 prototype set of hardware that has been submitted to the NSA for evaluation. The components utilized for this first development phase were the FC-X Inline Network Encryptor, the ES520 Deployable Mesh Point and the ES210 Tactical Mesh Point. The ES210 serves as a prototype wireless sensor interface module, allowing the connection of serial and Ethernet sensors. The ES520 is the wireless access point, and the FC-X serves as a Gateway for the network, providing an additional layer of security. Add re s s i n g t h e c o n c e r n with latency, the Fortress wireless network implementing Suite B has been shown to be capable of deterministic response of less than 1 s based on 24 h/7 d a week continuous testing. Spoofing and man-in-the-middle attacks are prevented since the Suite B design requires that each data transmission include an encrypted digital signature. Multiple layers of encryption virtually eliminate the ability to hack the network.
For the air monitoring system, the RS232 interface on the single board computer is connected to the ES210 wireless sensor interface module. The radiation level and system status data are then transmitted wirelessly from the ES210 to the process monitoring LAN where a computer displays and logs the data.
Implementation of the Monitoring System
The wireless air monitoring system hardware has been installed in a field process environment for evaluation and testing. The screen wire ion chamber and wireless sensor network have been in operation for several months collecting data and undergoing routine source checks. To further evaluate the effect of dust and dirt on the chamber, it is being operated without the five micron filter paper for part of the field evaluation and then with the paper for the remainder of testing. The data collection software receives the ion chamber data and logs important parameters, including any errors or alarms, for later examination.
In addition to the field testing, a lab mockup has been operating continuously with simulated sensor data and network performance monitoring. This testing has been valuable in refining the system's settings and operation during the development process. All network components are "pinged" for availability once per second, and the information is archived for review. The lab results have shown that the wireless network can be highly reliable. So far, the testing has been limited to a static non-mobile sensor arrangement with one sensor and one access point. Additional testing is planned with mobile sensor applications and roaming between access points.
Fortress has also recently delivered a prototype Suite B wireless network interface for thin client laptops and tablet computers. This interface will allow the connection of mobile operator and engineering computer assets to the secure network, allowing more flexibility in the performance of daily operator rounds, process engineering walk downs, and troubleshooting.
Conclusion
SRNL has developed a stand-alone radiation monitoring system utilizing a Suite B-based, ultra secure, short range wireless sensor network. While the radiation sensor is specific to nuclear facilities, the short range wireless sensor network is adaptable to other applications as well to those which require high reliability with ultra secure protection of the wireless data network.
